Addendum To Mets’ Cutting GCL Club
After reading, watching, and listening to several perspectives on the Mets’ decision to eliminate their Gulf Coast League team, I have a few bullet points to present for conversation:
– Various reports confirm that a GCL club costs less than $1M to operate. If the Mets have to find ways to skim such a relatively miniscule amount of money, how close to bankruptcy are they?
– How is cutting $1M toward the development of two dozen teenagers more beneficial toward long-term planning / success than giving $11M instead of $12M to 32-year-old “closer” Frankie Francisco? (And I challenge Francisco to find another MLB team willing to offer more than $8M over two years in this saturated closer market; Omar Minaya would have been grilled beyond reproach for this deal.)
– Sandy Alderson has expressed — time and time again — that “player development” provides “bang for the buck” and makes “good financial sense”. Someone (Sandy?) please explain how this move is consistent with these statements.
– The patent excuse seems to be that this elimination puts the Mets “in line” with the rest of “the industry”, in that most other MLB clubs have only 6 minor league affiliates, etc. OK, I can understand that explanation — IF the Mets also remain “in line” with all other aspects of running a big-league club. Are they? I’m not sure; maybe they are.
– Another excuse/argument is that the Mets still have two developmental teams in the Dominican Republic. But, the new CBA puts a cap on international signings, so, a.) how is this surplus an advantage; and b.) how long before the Mets eliminate one of these two operations?
– Having extra player development resources was supposed to be the Mets’ unique advantage and efficient answer to cutting big-league payroll, wasn’t it?
– No matter which way you slice it, and regardless of whether this move truly makes “fiscal sense” or is being unnecessarily overblown, you have to admit that the timing is absolutely awful.