Does anyone else see “April 1st” as a fitting day to make such a decision?
Yes, from the beginning the Escobar signing was seen as a “risk-reward” situation. But you have to wonder if any other team was willing to risk $1.5M guaranteed on a pitcher with extensive, chronic shoulder problems, had been shut down after tossing only five innings in 2009, and would not have passed a physical.
We are going to assume that the Mets gave Escobar a “Putz Physical”, because if his arm was “weak” in February, then how could it possibly have been healthy, or “strong”, in mid-December?
The Mets’ pattern of throwing good money after bad continues, and nothing is learned by mistakes. I understand the idea of “low risk, high reward”, and often support it. But you have to examine exactly what “low risk” really means.
$1.5M doesn’t seem like a “high risk” for big-market team like the Mets — and it shouldn’t be. But when you gamble $1.5M on damaged goods, and you pencil in those goods as your setup man, how can it be defined as “low risk” ?
What makes the “low-risk” gampble more risky is inserting another “low-risk, high-reward” proposition as Plan B — a Japanese import.
We’ve beaten this horse before, but it bears repeating: the Mets overspend as a rule, and yes, it IS an issue even when it’s “only” one or two million dollars. The Mets bid against themselves in spending $3.5M on Escobar and Cora — a sum total that would have netted, say, Bobby Crosby and Bobby Howry … or, say, Felipe Lopez, Clay Condrey, and LOOGY Javier Lopez. We could play this game all day — fill in the players of your choice. Bottom line is the Mets continue to be penny-wise and pound-foolish, gamble on multiple high (not low) risks, then wonder how the second-highest payroll in MLB can result in second-to-last place finish.
One thing’s for sure: I know exactly how I’m betting if I see Omar Minaya rolling the dice at a craps table in Atlantic City.